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FINANCING THE WAR. A symposium conducted by the Tax Institute. Phila-
delphia: The Tax Institute, 1942. Pp. ix, 357. $2.50.
A VOLUME which contains, as this one does, the contributions of eighteen
different economists usually offers abundant grist for the mills of those who
contend that economics is a socially worthless subject since no two of its
practitioners ever agree. The complaint is never more than a rather naive
half-truth, and in the present instance no support is to be found even for
the sometimes valid half. For there is in these eighteen essays a remarkable
degree of unanimity on fundamental matters that were very improperly under-
stood in the difficult years from 1914 to 1918. Indeed one of the few encour-
aging aspects of this war is that for once economists everywhere are in
virtually unanimous agreement in their recommendations concerning public
policy. There are of course differences of opinion on matters of method and
procedure whose importance the contending parties have a professional in-
terest in exaggerating. But these controversies generally break out in the
superstructure of the analysis. The main pillars of the argument, erected
only fairly recently, support a platform on which nearly all economists staid
together.
This common foundation is very well described in the two articles which
constitute Part One of "Financing the War." In these articles, one by
Robert Warren of Princeton, the other by Homer Jones of the F.D.I.C.,
a conception of the role of war finance is developed which is much broader
than that we would have expected from tax experts twenty years ago. The
emphasis is no longer on how to provide funds with which the Treasury
can "pay for the war." The function of federal fiscal policy is recognized
to be no less than that of directing the flow of spending in the economy in
such a way as to secure maximum war production with a minimum of dis-
location and injustice, especially of those types of dislocation which accom-
pany an inflation. There is a clear statement of the terrific strains which
a war program imposes on the price system, and a vivid description of the
necessity for adopting measures which will keep the price level within bounds.
This means a level of taxes and of savings drawn from the public sufficient
to prevent consumers from trying to spend more than the available volume
of consumer goods is worth at current prices. There is complete agreement
by all eighteen authors that in a modern war taxes and savings, forced or
voluntary, must be vastly greater than ever before, indeed substantially
greater than anything the Government has yet proposed. Furthermore, the
controversy which raged in the early days of the Defense Program as to
whether inflation should be prevented by the direct methods of price control
and rationing or the indirect methods of fiscal policy is in the main sig-
nificantly absent from these pages. It appears to be generally recognized
that all the economic weapons in the federal arsenal must be employed in
a comprehensive fashion.
Taking this very important set of first principles for granted, the remaining
sixteen essays concern themselves with the detailed implementation of the
objectives set forth by Messrs. Warren and Jones. Part Two consists of
a single piece by Frank E. Seidman on the influence of excess profits taxa-
tion on business policy. While accepting the principle of excess profits
taxation, Mr. Seidman points to many ways in which, he alleges, the present
law is inequitable. Thus, he argues that the bases set up for exemption,
which insure large profits for many war industries, will also throttle some
of the smaller, more efficient firms.
Part Three deals with the difficult issues involved in deciding what kinds
of taxes and what sorts of borrowing will be most equitable and most effec-
tive in preventing inflation. Denzel C. Cline, discussing general sales taxes
and selective excises, assembles a good deal of information and brings out
some of the crucial issues, but fails to meet them squarely with vigorous
recommendations. Alzada Comstock presents a strong case for the inade-
quacy of income and profits taxation to prevent inflation unless they are
used in conjunction with price control and rationing. Simeon E. Leland,
in a very competent and well documented discussion of income taxes versus
sales taxes, concludes with a set of clearly formulated proposals involving
selective excise taxes to reduce consumption of particular commodities com-
bined with greatly increased income taxes to cut general purchasing power.
Only if these means prove inadequate does he urge a general sales tax.
A plan for a flat rate income tax on all incomes to be collected at the
source is outlined by Harley L. Lutz, who appears still to have reservations
about the basic principle of progressive taxation; while forced loans and
social security taxes are considered by Albert Gailord Hart. The latter
emphasizes the fact that the only really important objective is a vigorous and
immediate reduction of purchasing power. He feels that the source-deducted
income tax is in many ways better than forced savings, but points out that
if the latter is politically more acceptable it should by all means be tried.
Charles Cortez Abbott presents a plan for forced savings by debtors, which
would be combined with incentives for them to repay their debts, and
E. Gordon Keith presents a good review of the conditions, by now familiar,
in which government borrowing is anti-inflationary.
The outstanding characteristic of this section is that no pitched battles
whatsoever are waged. There are differences of interest and of emphasis,
but the over-all impression left by these seven articles is that the authors
would agree on the following points: The Government must act much more
vigorously than it has to date to reduce purchasing power and to control
prices. No single instrument of inflation control will be adequate. Heavy
taxes should be imposed. For the most part income taxes are to be preferred
to sales taxes, though some use will have to be made of both. Income taxes
must be so designed that they will act more quickly and positively in response
to changes in income, and will not be too costly to collect from the lower
income brackets. A withholding tax of some sort should be designed for
this purpose. If taxes are politically impossible to impose in sufficient quan-
tity, they may be sweetened by converting some of them into forced loans.
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But whatever techniques are adopted they must be comprehensive, and on
a scale sufficient to be effective.
The essays in Part Four are somewhat more technical discussions of
special tax problems produced by the war effort. Walter W. Heller presents
a very welcome analysis of the various methods which might be used in
collecting income taxes promptly in wartime, and concludes with a detailed
plan. Charles L. Kades and Chester B. Pond come to nearly identical con-
clusions concerning the proper relations between state and federal taxation,
while Charles P. White considers the increasingly important problem of the
kind and volume of payments which the Federal Government might properly
make in lieu of local taxes on its property.
Parts Five and Six deal with the experience of other countries and with
tariffs and international relations respectively. Brinley Thomas and William
H. Wynne indicate how Britain and Canada have found it necessary to
adopt over-all comprehensive programs of inflation control very similar to
that which emerges from the recommendations of the earlier essays in this
book. Both countries have severe price control, a level of taxation much
higher than our own, and a much more vigorous program of direct income
controls. These two chapters provide empirical evidence to support the
common thesis developed in earlier pages. The last two chapters written
by Benjamin Wallace and Grayson Kirk are somewhat off the subject of
the other essays, being devoted to a discussion of the interrelation of tariffs
and national security. It is agreed that tariffs can be reduced or removed
only if a political climate of security for all nations can be established.
This reviewer has only one fault to find with the volume as a whole.
Remarkably little attention is devoted to the domestic economic problems
which will plague the economy after the war as a result of wartime financing.
The problem of preventing inflation during a war, when the entire nation
can be mobilized behind a no-spending program by the fire of patriotism,
is a simple one compared to the difficulties of restraining a burst of relieved
expenditure at the conclusion of hostilities. How can the Government
restrict the wholesale liquidation of War Savings Bonds at this time without
pushing the prices of other Government Securities down so far as to en-
danger the solvency of the banking system? How can the Government
control the timing of the repayment of wartime borrowing so as to make
it coincide with a postwar slump and not a postwar inflation? These are
vital matters and it is regrettable that so little attention is currently being
given them.
But in spite of this omission, we should be grateful indeed for this evi-
dence that economists can, in a time of crisis, agree on a prescription. It is
the more surprising in view of this unanimity that Congress and the Admin-
istration have proceeded so timidly to date in the construction of a really
vigorous tax program. As Mr. Warren says:
"While we applaud the expressions of academicians, publicists, and
officials as being admirable statements of the function and scope of
contemporary war finance, two things remain to be seen: (1) whether
our responsible agencies (public and private) have the capacity to
translate into effective action principles which they have, so to
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speak, learned by hearsay or derived from their own cerebrations
rather than out of bitter personal experience; and (2) whether the
American public, which is, in economic and pecuniary matters, much
less a community or commonwealth than a federation of tightly
organized, mutually jealous, and politically powerful groups, will
be willing to accept these principles."
MYAX M[ILLIKANt
LAW AND PEACE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. By Hans Kelsen. Cam-
bridge: The Harvard University Press, 1942. Pp. xi, 181. $2.00.
THE present volume comprises a series of lectures given by the famed
founder of the Pure Theory of Law as Oliver Wendell Holmes Lecturer
at the Harvard Law School in March 1941; the result constitutes one of
the most original contributions to the burning question of the causes under-
lying the failure of the League of Nations to preserve international peace
and the future replacement of its faulty machinery. The Geneva system
broke down, so the author believes, chiefly because its framers disregarded
the law of evclution in international relations. The Covenant placed the
Council, an executive organ, not the Permanent Court of International Jus-
tice, at the center of its organization; thus the attempt was made to jump
ahead rather than to take merely "the next step" in the development of
international law. The author sees a compelling analogy in the growth of
law within the State which shows that the centralization of the judiciary
precedes the centralization of legislative and executive power in the process
of evolution from a lower to a higher stage of legal organization.
This analogy is, of course, justified only if international law is "law" in
the same sense as the rules of national law whose pattern of evolution it
is presumed to follow. The author's first concern, therefore, is to prove
that both national and international law are social orders of the same type.
Reduced to its essential elements, law is defined as an order which assures
the peaceful living together of its subjects by monopolizing the use of force
as a reaction against illegal acts, as a sanction against a delict. That is
precisely the r6le assigned to force in international law, whether employed
by way of reprisals or by waging war. Theory and practice agree that
reprisals are a means of compulsion against a State which has committed
an internationally wrongful act. Less clear, however, is the function of
war within the system of international sanctions. Those who adhere to the
doctrine of the bellm jusum, viz., the concept that wars are permissible
only for the redress of an injury suffered, will find little or no difficulties
tAssistant Professor of Economics, Yale University.
1. Some of these views had already been expressed by the author in an earlier study
on TaE LEGAL PROCESS AND INTERNATIONAL ORDER (1935). See also his address Essential
Conditions of International Justice (1941) Pnoc Am Soc. INT. L. 70 ct seq.
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in interpreting war as an "arm of the law" or a remedy against a legal
wrong. The opposite and at present still prevailing view, according to which
a State may proceed to war against any other State on any ground without
violating general international law, makes such interpretation impossible.
Without choosing between those two views, although indicating a certain
preference for the theory of the just war, the author merely states that
international law, lacking a proper organ charged with the application of
its norms in concrete cases, authorizes the States to take the law into their
own hands whenever they have reason to believe that their rights and inter-
ests have been wrongfully interfered with. In other words, general inter-
national law is characterized by the legal technique of self-help.
From this realization that war in the international legal order performs
the function attributed to individual blood revenge (vendetta) in primitive
society, the conclusion is derived that international law is still in the early
stages of its evolution. Further evidence of its primitive nature is found
by comparing its technique with that of the law within the State. Law has
here achieved its highest degree of centralization, first with respect to the
application of legal norms, to be followed by the institution of central organs
charged with the creation and execution of the law. The international
community of States, on the other hand, is characterized by complete de-
centralization. Its legal norms are created chiefly by individual treaties be-
tween the States. In the absence of internatiqnal courts, the decision as to
the circumstances conditioning the application of international law is left
to the parties. Finally, the execution of the sanction is decentralized by the
operation of the principle of self-help.
If progressive centralization is the evolutionary principle of law, conscious
efforts to reform the international community with a view to the promotion
of peace must start with the question what direction the centralization should
be given in its constitution. Centralization of the law-creating function is
rejected because it would lead to the establishment of a super-state, which
is as yet a political impossibility. The next step in shaping "a legal reality
which from a certain point of view - that of the ideal of peace - is regarded
as an improvement upon the present state" is the institution of an inter-
national court with compulsory jurisdiction. "Nature makes no jump; and
neither can the law."
The author's method of approaching the problem of international peace
by analyzing the structure and present stage of development of international
law as the condition precedent to reform proposals serves to reaffirm faith
in the reality of traditional international law. This is particularly needed
in view of the rising tide of idealistic schemes for world organization which
has followed a widespread disappointment with the existing international
order. Much as technical deficiencies might have contributed to the eventual
collapse of the League, the Covenant, embryonic and imperfect in many
respects, could have formed a working basis, had its application not been
constantly thwarted by the game of power politics which its principal signa-
tories continued to play. 2 Even the establishment of an international judi-
2. For further discussion on this point see KEETON AND SCIVARZENBMGrR, MAKING
INTERNATIONAL LAW WORK (1939) 166 ff.
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ciary as the next step on the road to a peaceful international order will fall
short of its goal, if political and economic obstacles to a genuine community
of States remain. The- danger of violent attacks on the international system,
however, will be greatly diminished, and law will achieve supremacy in the
relations among States, if legitimate aspirations can be satisfied through an
adequate machinery of peaceful change.
JOACHIM VON ELBEf
CONQUEST AND MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE LEGAL LIMITATIONS
ON THE ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY BY CONQUEST. By .Matthew NM.
Mc'Mahon. Washington: The Catholic University of America Press,
1940. Pp. vi, 233. $2.00.
THE discussion of conquest is timely in a world convulsed by armed
conflict and- longing for peace. Interest is high not merely in the practical
effect of conquest but also in the world's aversion to the institution of conquest
as a means of acquiring new territory or regaining lost lands. Mr. McMahon's
interest is primarily, as he puts it, in "the legal nature of modern conquest."
(p.v).
The development of his thesis is in keeping with this limitation. His in-
troductory chapter is devoted to a discussion of the varying definitions of
conquest and its legal nature, which includes a brief treatment of pacta sunt
servanda. He turns then to an historical survey of theory, practice and
modern opinion. Here he has conveniently collected and arranged the
opinions of the more important experts in the field and the traditional Euro-
pean examples of conquest problems, such as the partition of Poland, the
Schleswig-Holstein and Hesse-Cassel cases. The judicial treatment of con-
quest problems is limited to Anglo-American cases, and the Palmas Island
case before The Hague Tribunal. Mr. AlcMahon finds treaty limitations
upon the right of conquest in the 1907 Hague Conventions, especially No. 2,
the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Nine Power Treaty, the Briand-
Kellogg Pact, and the many Pan American contributions. The chapters
on non-recognition and non-intervention are based chiefly upon League and
United States experience.
MIr. MIcMahon's conclusion that "the growth of peaceful change and the
legal restrictions on the use of force in the relations of states have tended
to make the act of conquest illegal" (p. 214) strikes a strangely fanciful
note in today's sorry world. He finds encouragement in "the extraordinary
growth of international legislation, which is the basis of order in the inter-
national society." The deceptive nature of the paper record has long been
apparent in fields of national law. The idealistically conceived law often
collects dust, if not disparagement, in national living. Its parallel exists also
in international law. The universal desire for the disappearance of war has
been written into international paper; but neither individuals, nor states,
t-Research Assistant, Yale School of Law.
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nor international organizations have yet had the courage to put to real and
effective test the machinery which they have designed, because desire has
outrun possible performance. Thus, the paper record of formal renunciation
of war and conquest, which Mr. McMahon has skilfully built up, is super-
ficially encouraging, but there is ample evidence of its fragile and illusory
nature. The curbing influences of the reservations written into the Kellogg
Pact, the difficulties implicit in the definition of a just war and in permitting
national definition of self-defense, and the limitations born of the Japanese
and British "Monroe doctrines" have often been demonstrated in the past
twenty years. The failure of adjustment of territorial problems under the
Covenant, and the frustration in practice of the doctrines of sanctions and
non-recognition, through evasion and legal artifice, have likewise been fre-
quently shown. If there is to be any advance toward a working solution
of the world's ills, if and when the present conflict ends, it will be achieved
not merely through the study of international paper, but also through study
of international conduct and the correction of philosophies which gave birth
to such friction in international living. This essential part of the problem
Mr. McMahon has not met and answered and, because he has not, his con-
clusions lack force and conviction.
PHOEBE MORRISoN t
AMERIcAN REGULATION OF ARMS EXPORTS. By Elton Atwater. Endow-
ment for International Peace, Monograph Series, Division of International
Law, No. 4. Washington, 1941. Pp. viii, 287. $2.00.
PROFESSOR Atwater has filled the desperate need for a competent mono-
graph on this confused and vitally important subject. He takes the reader
back into the diplomatic history of the United States for the origin of govern-
mental regulation of arms exports, which many people first associate only
with the neutrality legislation of 1935. After stressing a century and a hal[
of "Jeffersonian" policy of no regulation, he shows how President Theodore
Roosevelt, acting under his power as commander-in-chief of the army and
navy, first administered an embargo (it was more like a blockade, we sug-
gest) of arms and munitions of war from the United States to revolutionary
elements which were obstructing the Dominican Government's arrangements
for a United States customs receivership. This executive action was the
first instance of peace-time regulation of the export of arms and munitions.
The next step was the joint resolution of March 14, 1912, which gave the
President discretionary power, with such limitations and exceptions as should
seem expedient to him, to limit the export of arms and munitions of war
to any American country where conditions of violence might be promoted by
the use of them. President Taft used this power to deny exports of muni-
tions to Madero's enemies in Mexico, and Woodrow Wilson used it to
support constitutional governments there, as he identified them to suit his
tResearch Associate, Yale School of Law.
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idealistic political purposes. Since Woodrow Wilson's time the power has
been used by Presidents (in the case of Mexico, Nicaragua, Honduras, Cuba
and Brazil) to shut off the flow of arms and munitions of war to consignees
not authorized by the established governments of certain Caribbean states,
and sometimes to established governments not properly amenable to United
States policy.
The purpose of the law of 1912, the author emphasizes, was to discourage
revolutions and promote the stability of states in a region where the United
States was vitally interested for its own security. It has not been extended
to other American states, except in the case of Brazil in 1930, and then
it was "theoretically" under the obligations of the Inter-American Treaty
on the Duties and Rights of States in the Event of Civil Strife (Havana,
1928), which provides for the embargo of arms and munitions of war to
revolutionary elements within the states of the contracting parties unless
belligerency has been recognized. This treaty has brought the United States
policy of 1912 a very considerable way toward being a principle of inter-
American public law. It has been ratified by the United States and by twelve
other American Republics, including M, exico and Brazil. In the opinion
of the reviewer it deserves more emphasis than the casual mention it receives
in this treatise.
The Joint Resolution of January 8, 1922, added to American states those
countries in which the United States enjoyed extraterritorial rights, as
regions to which the President might embargo the export of arms and muni-
tions of war. Here Dr. Atwater sees an effort to cooperate with other powers
to dry up revolutionary conditions in China rather than a desire to extend
to the Far East any Latin-American, or rather Caribbean policy. The result-
ing embargo (1922-29) was imperfectly successful, because of faulty inter-
national cooperation.
The author carefully reviews the movement, originating with Secretary
of State Stimson in 1933, to give the President a discretionary power to
prevent the export of arms and munitions of war to "aggressor" states, and
the debates over this proposal. In the case of the Chaco WVar, Congress was
successful in insisting upon an impartial embargo against both belligerents
rather than against the adjudged aggressor. The resulting United States
embargo was on the "sale" rather than the "export" of arms and munitions
of warfare, and the author considers this to have been an undignified and
unnecessary expedient of getting around "nineteenth century" treaties of
commerce with Bolivia and Paraguay which prohibited discriminatory em-
bargoes. Further, it weakened the embargo.
In the case of the neutrality legislation of 1935-39, in which for the first
time the United States relied on the embargo as a means of keeping the
country out of war, Congress again prevailed on the executive to the extent
of requiring that any embargo of arms, ammunition and implements of war-
fare be impartially applied to all belligerents; but the author rightly empha-
sizes the enormous significance of the discretionary power which the Presi-
dent quickly found in the conventional wording "whenever the President
shall find." This enabled President Roosevelt to proclaim neutrality,
and the resulting mandatory embargo of arms, ammunition and implements
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of warfare against both belligerents, in the case of the Italo-Ethiopian War
of 1935, but not in the case of the far greater Sino-Japanese War of 1937.
The author concludes that the President, if he happens to agree with Congress
as to the desirability of neutrality and consequent embargo in a given situa-
tion, has sufficient discretionary or assumed authority to have his way,
whether by the loophole afforded by the wording of the law, by his way of
enforcing the law, or by the imposition extra-legally of "moral embargoes".
The reviewer would agree that the President does have the better of Congress
in the administration of this legislation- up to a certain point. But if he
had refused to "find" a war in existence in Europe in September, 1939,
as he had refused to find one in the Far East in 1937, he might have run
the danger of impeachment, so unanimously set was Congressional and
general public opinion on staying neutral and keeping out of war.
The author goes rather hastily over the debate on neutrality legislation
from 1935-39. His conclusion seems to be that the Neutrality Act of 1939
was a departure from neutrality. Under cover of neutrality and a professed
desire to keep out of war its advocates disguised their real purpose, now
avowed, to help the democracies by supplying them with arms to defend
themselves against conquest. Both advocates and opponents of repeal of
the embargo confused the legal status of neutrality with the diplomatic effects
of neutrality. Given the repeal of the arms embargo in 1939, the author
finds the United States without any fixed policy regarding the regulation
of arms exports beyond keeping them under control and license, and not
allowing them to go to any friendly country without the approval of its
established Government. These policies he favors, but he remains skeptically
non-committal about any settling of policy or refusing exports to "nations
viewed as 'aggressors' " while permitting them to 'victims of aggression.'
This objective study adheres to all the canons of conscientious scholarship.
If its frequent summaries and repetitious language seem persistently tauto-
logical, they nevertheless have the effect of thoroughly drilling the subject
into the reader's mind by the time he finishes the book. Again the Carnegie
Endowment is to be congratulated on publishing an important volume. It is
helpful to have pointed out the dangers, as well as the advantages to the
cause of peace that can flow from embargoes of arms, ammunition and
implements of warfare. The book was published before Pearl Harbor.
SAMUEL FLAGO BEMISt
versity.
t Farnam Professor of Diplomatic History and Inter-American Relations, Yale Uni-
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